



GS Paper II – Governance

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Delhi most unsafe for women and children, show new NCRB data

Ashna Butani
Shrimansi Kaushik
NEW DELHI

Delhi recorded the highest number of crimes – 13,396 – against women among all metropolitan cities, according to the National Crime Records Bureau's (NCRB) 'Crime in India 2024' report, which was released on Wednesday.

The Capital saw an increase in crimes against women, with 13,366 offences reported in 2023, even as the total number of criminal cases declined year on year.

Delhi also topped the list for rapes (1,058), kidnappings and abductions (3,974), and dowry deaths (109) among the 19 major cities. Additionally, 78 cyber offences against women were documented in the city in 2024. Its overall crime tally dropped from 3,43,483 in 2023 to 2,97,666 in 2024, yet it still topped the list among metro cities.

The city's crime rate for women, defined as the number of crimes against women per one lakh people, for 2024 stood at 176.8. One acid attack case was reported in 2024, a decrease from 2023 when six such cases were recorded.

Most murder cases

The national capital also witnessed the highest number of violent crimes (12,569) and murder cases (504) among all the metropolitan cities.

It also recorded the highest number of thefts (1,29,675) and snatchings

The city saw a rise in crimes against SCs and STs in 2024, when 137 cases were reported, as against 128 in the previous year

(3,105), as well as the highest number of cases (1,553) registered under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act among the major cities. Regarding crimes against children, 7,662 cases came to light in 2024, a marginal decrease from 7,731 in 2023. In 2022, the national capital reported 7,468 such cases, as per official data.

Delhi's crime rate against children was 138.4, significantly above the national average of 42.3. The number of kidnappings and abductions of children stood at 5,404, which was significantly higher than in other metro cities.

Two cases of foeticide and four cases registered under charges of murder with rape/POCSO were also reported in the city. Notably, the city saw a rise in crimes against Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). A total of 133 crimes were reported against persons belonging to SC communities, up from 126 in the previous year, and four such crimes against STs, up from two in the previous year. Meanwhile, with 404 cases, the Capital reported fewer cybercrimes, down from 407 in 2023 and 685 in 2022. Among the metro cities, Bangalore registered most such incidents – 17,561.



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Cost of success

The BJP's path to victory in Assam undermined the health of India's polity

Himanta Biswa Sarma is expected to take oath as Chief Minister after leading the BJP to power in Assam yet again. Mr. Sarma was a Congress leader when the party came to power in the north-eastern State in 2011, but switching sides in 2015, he became the central figure of the BJP not only in Assam but also in States around it. Starting in 2001 on a Congress ticket, he has won six consecutive elections from the same Assembly seat. Having emerged as a very powerful leader, he joined the BJP, and was appointed Chief Minister in 2021. Since then, he has reshaped the politics of the State through exceptional organisational ability, communal rhetoric, and the partisan use of state power. An infrastructure push combined with welfare delivery – the Orunodoi scheme of direct cash transfer to women and Mission Basundhara, a flagship initiative to streamline and digitise land records and protect land rights – not only enabled the BJP's deep expansion, but along with other measures, including the delimitation of Assembly constituencies in 2023, reshaped the State's political landscape. Mr. Sarma has been both the creator and the principal beneficiary of this process.

The BJP's victory in Assam has significant implications for power dynamics within the party nationally. Mr. Sarma is perceived to be close to Union Home Minister Amit Shah. The BJP alone commands a majority in the 126-strong Assembly, and the ruling coalition has 102 members. The BJP has not only decimated the Opposition but also rendered regional parties inconsequential. It has consolidated a spectrum of fragmented social groups and diluted the linguistic and ethnic politics of the State. But in doing so, it has sharply polarised Assam along religious lines. The delimitation carved out constituencies by packing and cracking communities in ways that suppress Muslim representation, with the BJP and the Congress now mirroring a Hindu-Muslim binary in the newly elected Assembly. Eviction drives have disproportionately targeted Bengali-speaking Muslim communities; 40,000 individuals were displaced in 2025 alone, officially framed as anti-encroachment action but widely seen as selective targeting. Assam is a sensitive border region, and the BJP's approach to its governance needs to be commensurately sensitive. All parties have a legitimate right to consolidate themselves and win elections. But that must be done with the utmost attention to the long-term health of the polity and the interests of the country as a whole. At this moment of triumph, the BJP in Assam would do well to reflect on the costs of the victory that it has just secured.

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GS Paper II – Social Issue

Understanding inequality in India's growth story

There have been some significant policy changes in the recent past – this includes the implementation of the new Labour Codes and the Viksit Bharat-Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Bill, 2025 replacing the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) – which have raised serious concerns regarding the welfare of informal workers and those belonging to rural India. These changes are accompanied by the official understanding that inequality is much less of a concern today than it was in the early 2010s, even though data comparability itself is an issue.

Inequality estimates, initial observations
Analysis of inequality warrants clarification on a few issues, among other things. The first is inequality of what – income, wealth, consumption expenditure? Second, how is it measured? Third, along which axis it is assessed – caste, class, gender, religion?, and fourth, data source and comparability of estimates generated from multiple surveys, if



Saswata Guha Thakurata
Assistant Professor,
Department of Economics, FLAME University, Pune



Chaitanya Talreja
Assistant Professor,
Department of Economics, Shiv Nadar University Chennai

marked with methodological changes. Our estimate from the Household Consumer Expenditure Survey (HCES 2023-24), conducted by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), suggests that overall consumption expenditure inequality, measured by the Gini index, is 0.29 – higher than the widely cited World Bank estimate of 0.25. The World Bank's method too, in this regard, came under scrutiny. With further disaggregation, one finds that urban, as expected, is more unequal than the rural sector. India's consumption boom during the last couple of decades has been primarily driven by non-food expenditure. We find that inequality is much higher for the same compared to food expenditure. This is true for the rural and urban sectors, the inequality for both being higher in case of the urban sectors, and relatively more for non-food expenditure.

Since most growth-inducing activities are urban-centric and agricultural distress persists, it is imperative to examine the urban-rural gap, which is shown by the mean ratio here. A higher than unity mean ratio would reflect a relatively better position than the respective all-India average. Lesser than unity would imply otherwise. There is a substantial gap between urban and rural sectors in this regard and the disparity is more striking in the case of non-food expenditure. For example, average urban non-food monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) is about 1.5 times higher than the all-India average, while that for rural is much lower than the same point of reference.

Our disaggregated analysis also reveals a considerable gap between the consumption share and per-capita spending of overall MPCE-based deciles. In the urban sector, the top 10% of the population alone contributes 27% of the total non-food expenditure, implying that the rest of the 90% contributes only 73% of the same. The mean MPCE of the topmost decile is six times that of the bottom most decile for the urban sector, compared to 4.5 times in the rural sector. Strikingly, the mean MPCE of the top most decile in the urban sector is nine times that of the bottom most decile in the rural sector. Once we proceed a step further and decompose total inequality into within- and between-group components, it appears that: in urban India, within-decile and between-decile inequalities account for about 33% and 67% of food expenditure inequality, respectively, and about 10% and 90% of non-food expenditure inequality. The relative importance of between-decile group

inequality for non-food consumption holds true for the rural sector too. Further, the per-capita consumption expenditure of the richest 5% is six times higher than that of the poorest 5% in the rural areas; the same is nine times for urban areas. In short, the urban sector, which is more affluent, is more unequal than its rural counterparts.

Inequality dynamics in India

First, it is almost unanimously agreed upon that the superrich segment of the Indian population is hardly captured by the NSS surveys (consumption or wealth); thus any inequality estimation based on the same is a gross underestimation. Our own calculation based on this data suggests that about one fourth of even the richest 10% in India benefited from the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana (PMKAY) and about 13% of them have access to Below Poverty Line (BPL) ration cards.

Second, for a nuanced understanding of inequality dynamics in India, one must go beyond inter-personal or solely income/spending groups-based (for example, decile; percentile) inequality calculations and analyse disparity along various socio-economic axes such as caste and class. Deploying an alternative class-based analysis alongside a closer examination of the growth process and policy changes since Independence, Vamsi Vakulabharanam of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, in his book, *Class and Inequality in China and India, 1950-2010*, shows that since the 1980s (even before the 1991 reforms), urban owners, managers, and professionals have gained disproportionately, contributing to India's consumption boom.

In contrast, urban informal workers, rural small farmers, and agricultural labourers have lagged markedly behind. All these added to increasing between-class inequality vis-à-vis within-class inequality in India's evolving urban landscape. Over the last decade or so, there has not been any systemic change despite various welfare measures, to counter or reverse such trend in class-based inequality. Typical explorations of inequality often overlook this growth-class-inequality nexus. Moreover, a large share of Indians remains engaged in debt-led consumption. The complexities involved in the issue of inequality in India warn us that policies formulated on the presupposition of lower disparity could be misleading and may produce adverse, albeit unintended, welfare implications.

Consumption expenditure inequality in India

Locating inequality by space and consumption type





Figure 2: Urban – rural gap by consumption type

Source: Same as figure 1. Respective mean ratio is in parenthesis.
Note: Here, mean ratio implies the ratio of sectoral average MPCE to All India MPCE.
For example, mean ratio for urban non-food consumption is calculated as the ratio of average urban non-food MPCE to that of all India (rural and urban combined) average non-food MPCE.





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Fixing structural deficits in India's health system

In March 11, 2026, the Minister of State for Health, Anupriya Patel, informed Parliament that 43 new medical colleges have been established and 11,682 MBBS seats along with 8,967 postgraduate seats have been approved for the 2025-26 academic year.

Will this address India's problem of non-availability of doctors in the public health system? Of the 8,967 new postgraduate doctors, how many will actually have the inclination to serve in aspirational districts or underserved areas? Of the 43 newly sanctioned medical colleges, only eight are under State governments, eight are in the Employees' State Insurance (ESI) sector, and 27 are in the private sector. Private medical colleges, after charging high capitation fees, have no obligation to post their trainees in government service, nor can they be compelled to do so. There is also no clearly defined policy or stipulations to ensure that public health institutions benefit maximally by filling existing vacancies in specialist cadre posts.

Merely investing in capital expenditure and infrastructure alone will not yield the desired improvement in health services in hilly, tribal, and other remote underserved areas. Eleven out of 18 All India Institutes of Medical Sciences report around 40% vacancies in their teaching and research faculty positions. Without adequate research and teaching capacity, how can we effectively train specialists?

Glaring vacancy rate

According to The Health Dynamics of India 2022-23 report, the vacancy rate in 5,491 rural Community Health Centres (CHC) across 757 districts in India is 79.9%, with only 4,413 specialists available against a requirement of 21,964. Since 2014, the shortfall of specialists in CHCs has remained at around 17,500, despite the creation of additional postgraduate medical seats – 72,627 across 731 medical colleges.

Newly graduated specialists are often unwilling to work in remote and underserved areas due to inadequate facilities, including lack of equipment, decent staff quarters, schools for their children,



Dr. K.R. Antony

Public health system and policy development adviser

There needs to be greater alignment between medical education and public service

and adequate peer medical support. If specialists were available at CHCs, patients from rural and tribal areas would not need to travel long distances to district headquarters hospitals or medical colleges.

A CHC serves as a first referral unit for a population of about 1.6 lakh to 2 lakh and is expected to have 30 beds with five specialists – physician, surgeon, obstetrician, paediatrician, and anaesthetist. However, the majority of CHCs remain crippled due to a persistent shortage of specialists, a problem that has continued for many years.

Yet, States continue to construct more CHCs to utilise available central government funds, even though many of them function effectively as primary health centres. There are 5,491 CHCs across 785 districts – about seven CHCs per district – which is not a feasible model. With only 4,413 specialists available at present, just 882 CHCs can be fully operationalised, effectively leaving only one functional CHC per district in addition to the district hospital for specialised care.

Flawed budgetary focus

The central health Budget is largely focused on infrastructure, without matching allocations for drugs, diagnostics, ambulance services, emergency care, or salaries for temporary staff. If the goal is to improve people's health, it must prioritise operational outcomes rather than merely investing capital in building construction, leaving the rest to be managed by State budgets.

How do we manage better with what we have in hand? We need to put the brakes on overly enthusiastic declarations of new CHCs, which often serve populist political mileage rather than functional need.

Classify all PHCs and CHCs into normal, difficult, and most difficult areas based on defined criteria, as was done in Chhattisgarh under the Rural Medical Corps Scheme. The most difficult areas are those with persistently high staff vacancies over long periods. Introduce special incentives such as additional

compensatory financial allowances, priority for postgraduate seats, staff quarters, and quality schooling facilities for children, among others.

Additional steps to take

Hereafter, all government-sponsored postgraduate seat allocations must be linked to existing vacancies in CHCs or district hospitals. Candidates willing to fill a specialist vacancy in a CHC should be allotted a seat in the corresponding speciality, with the assurance that upon completion of training, they will be posted there immediately.

Conversely, aspirant doctors must provide an undertaking to serve in the designated government facility first. Priority may be given to those who commit to a 10-year service bond in difficult-area CHCs, along with additional incentives under the National Health Mission. We must strictly follow an "all or none" principle in posting specialists – either all five specialists are placed in a CHC or none at all – avoiding piecemeal deployment or the dilution of services by spreading specialists too thinly.

Urgent construction of staff quarters and renovation of operation theatres, labour rooms, intensive care units, and 24-hour emergency units must be undertaken in such CHCs, which may number two or three per district. Similar undertakings and post graduate training can be awarded to nurses willing to serve in remote needy areas.

When adequate specialists are posted as a team at the sub-district or town level, the image of government hospitals improves in the public eye. The workload is better distributed, and optimal sharing reduces stress on doctors on duty. Interpersonal communication with patients also improves. This, in turn, enhances patient satisfaction and reduces conflicts between the public and doctors and other health staff.

We can no longer afford to see nearly 70,000 specialists graduating from 731 medical colleges without adequately filling the vacant posts in the public health system, which remains the only source of care for the poor and marginalised.



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Overall crime rate drops 6%; cybercrime up by 17%: NCRB

Deaths due to drug overdose saw a 50% increase in 2024 from the previous year's figures; T.N. records the most fatalities; 5,194 cases of offences 'against the state' registered, a rise of over 6%

Vijaita Singh
NEW DELHI

The overall crime rate in India declined in 2024 from the 2023 figure, but there was an increase of over 17% in cybercrime cases, show the Crime in India, 2024 report released by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) on Wednesday.


A total of 1,01,928 cybercrime cases were registered in 2024 over 86,420 such cases in the previous year.

"During 2024, 72.6% of cybercrime cases registered were for the motive of fraud (73,987 out of 1,01,928 cases) followed by sexual exploitation with 3.1% (3,190 cases) and extortion with 2.5% (2,536 cases)," the report said.

The NCRB recorded 58.86 lakh cognisable crimes across the country in 2024, marking a 6% decline from the previous year's figure. Of these, 35.44 lakh cases were registered under the Indian Penal Code and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and 23.41 lakh cases under special and local laws. There

Grim numbers

As many as 1,70,746 persons died by suicide in 2024, according to figures from the National Crime Records Bureau. A look at the percentage distribution according to profession shows that nearly a third of them were daily wage earners



were 5,194 cases of offences "against the state" registered in 2024 as against 4,873 in 2023, showing a rise of 6.6%.

"Out of 5,194 cases, 4,395 (84.6%) cases were registered under The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, followed by 649 (12.5%) cases under The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act," the report said.

Crime against SC/ST

The report revealed that a total of 55,698 cases were registered for crimes

against Scheduled Castes (SCs), showing a decrease of 3.6% over the 2023 figure of 57,789 cases. Crimes against Scheduled Tribes showed a sharp decline of 23.1%, dropping to 9,966 cases from 12,960 in 2023.

The NCRB released the Accidental Deaths & Suicides in India (ADSI), 2024 report according to which 1,70,746 suicides were recorded in 2024. Those associated with the agriculture sector, the unemployed, and daily wage workers accounted

for a substantial share of suicidal deaths.

A total of 10,546 persons involved in the farming sector (consisting of 4,633 farmers/cultivators and 5,913 agricultural labourers) died by suicide in 2024, accounting for 6.2%.

Out of 4,633 farmer/cultivator suicides, a total of 4,481 were by men and 152 by women, the report said. Around 31% of the total suicides were reported among the daily wagers, the report said. The number of unemployed people who died by suicide was 14,778 while the number of students and homemakers who ended their lives stood at 14,488 and 22,113, respectively.

Deaths due to drug overdose saw a 50% increase in 2024 from the previous year's figure. The report stated that 978 people died due to drug overdose in 2024, up from 650 deaths in 2023.

Tamil Nadu reported 313 deaths, the highest number of drug overdose deaths, followed by Punjab with 106, Madhya Pradesh 90, Rajasthan 69 and Mizoram 65, according to the NCRB data.



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GS Paper II – Polity

When does a CM cease to hold office?

Can a Governor remove a Chief Minister? What does 'pleasure of the Governor' mean? When is a floor test required? What happens after the Assembly's tenure ends? Can election results be challenged in court?

EXPLAINER

Aaratrika Bhaumik

The story so far:

A day after the Trinamool Congress lost the West Bengal elections to the BJP, party chairperson Mamata Banerjee on May 5 said she would not resign as Chief Minister, alleging that the verdict was the result of a "conspiracy" rather than the people's mandate. Addressing a press conference, Ms. Banerjee claimed the elections had not been conducted fairly and accused the BJP of misusing central forces to "forcibly capture" booths and influence the outcome. She added that the party would challenge the results and continue its political fight.

Can a Governor remove a CM?

Article 164(1) of the Constitution provides that "the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, and the Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor." On a literal reading of the provision, therefore, the Governor appears to possess the authority to remove a CM from office. However, members of the Constituent Assembly had cautioned that such a provision could potentially lend itself to an arbitrary exercise of gubernatorial discretion.

Constituent Assembly member Mohammad Ismail Khan had moved an amendment to the provision (then Article 144 of the Draft Constitution) proposing that the phrase "during the pleasure" be replaced with the words "so long as they enjoy the confidence of the Legislative Assembly of the State." He contended that once the constitutional scheme envisaged the Governor as a nominee of the



A woman walks past banners of Mamata Banerjee, on Wednesday, in Kolkata. PTI

President, the Constitution ought to have made it explicit that the Council of Ministers would hold office not at the Governor's pleasure, but only so long as it continued to enjoy the confidence of the Legislative Assembly.

Addressing this concern, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution, affirmed that the Council of Ministers shall hold office only so long as it enjoys the confidence of the majority. "The reason why we have not so expressly stated it," he explained, "is because it has not been stated in that fashion or in those terms in any of the Constitutions which lay down a parliamentary system of government."

Over the years, the Supreme Court has also interpreted the Governor's powers as flowing primarily from the "aid and advice" of the Council of Ministers. In *A.G. Perarivalan v. State Through Superintendent of Police (2022)*, the apex court observed that the "Governor" is "but a shorthand expression for the State government". While recognising the Governor as "the formal head and sole

repository of the executive power", the court held that the office is ordinarily bound by the aid and advice of the State's Council of Ministers.

When is a floor test required?

If a Governor asks a Chief Minister to step down and invites another candidate for the post while the tenure of the Legislative Assembly is still on, there has to be a floor test – a constitutional mechanism used to determine whether the executive enjoys the confidence of the legislature. Under this process, the Chief Minister must prove majority support in the House. Failure to do so requires the CM to resign.

If no party or coalition can form a stable government, President's Rule under Article 356 may be imposed as a measure of last resort.

What happens after the Assembly's tenure ends?

Article 172 of the Constitution deals with the duration of a State Legislative Assembly and stipulates that, "unless

sooner dissolved", an Assembly "shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer, and the expiration of the said period of five years shall operate as a dissolution of the Assembly."

According to the Election Commission, the current West Bengal Assembly commenced its term on May 8, 2021, and is set to expire on May 7. Thereafter, the Governor will have to initiate the process for constituting a new Assembly.

What happens next?

According to former Lok Sabha Secretary-General P.D.T. Achary, a formal resignation following defeat in an Assembly election is largely a matter of convention. "Even if Ms. Banerjee does not resign, it would make no material difference. The tenure of the present Assembly ends on May 7, and with its dissolution, she will automatically cease to hold office as Chief Minister," he said.

He, however, pointed out that an election petition may be filed before the Calcutta High Court within 45 days from the declaration of the results of the concerned candidate. Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 enumerates the grounds on which the election of a candidate may be challenged and declared void, including corrupt practices by the candidate and non-compliance with statutory provisions by the returning officer, among other grounds. He noted that a writ petition may be maintainable where the challenge concerns the integrity of the electoral process itself, including allegations of arbitrary voter deletions during the special intensive revision of electoral rolls in West Bengal.

"Large-scale deletion of voters in an election constitutes a violation of fundamental rights and can therefore be challenged through a writ petition," he said.

THE GIST

Though Article 164 states that the Council of Ministers holds office "during the pleasure of the Governor", this is not absolute; in practice, a Chief Minister can continue only so long as they enjoy the confidence of the Legislative Assembly.

The majority of a Chief Minister is determined through a floor test in the House, and if they fail to prove support, they must resign.



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GS Paper II – Polity

Nicobar gram sabhas signed off on infra project without 50% quorum

Abhinay Lakshman

NEW DELHI

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (A&N) administration did not achieve the mandated 50% quorum at the gram sabha meetings held to get consent for the Centre's ₹92,000-crore Great Nicobar Island project. Instead, it claimed to have done so by attendance figures ranging from 2% to 15% of the population, which, it argued in the Calcutta High Court, counted as "proper quorum". The submissions were made by the administration in an affidavit to the Bench that is hearing a batch of petitions alleging that procedures under the Forest Rights Act (FRA) had been violated in obtaining consent for the project.

Quorum is the minimum number of members



Submissions before the Calcutta HC show that meetings to get nod for the ₹92,000-crore plan didn't have mandated strength. FILE PHOTO

needed in such a meeting to reach a decision. According to the rules issued by the Centre for the implementation of the FRA, a quorum at a gram sabha is achieved only if 'one-half or 50% of the adult population of that village is in attendance, of which one-third must be women.

The administration submitted that meetings were held for Campbell Bay,

Laxmi Nagar, and Govind Nagar gram panchayats, covering seven villages, on August 12, 2022. The Campbell Bay meeting was attended by 105 people, the one in Laxmi Nagar by 163 people, and the Govind Nagar sabha had 81 people. The administration said all three meetings passed "unanimous" resolutions consenting to the project.

Compared to the popu-

lation of these gram panchayats as per the 2011 Census, the strength of the Campbell Bay meeting was 1.83% of the total population of 5,736, that of the Laxmi Nagar was 14.72% of the population of 1,107, and the attendance at the Govind Nagar meeting was 11.98% of the population of 676. Put together, 349 people (4.6%) signed off on the project at these three gram sabhas meant to represent seven villages, whose total population stood at 7,519 as of 2011.

The submissions, which were taken on record by the High Court on Wednesday, came after the Centre sought time from the court to "demonstrate that consent has been taken from the tribal people".

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What is Karnataka's new gig worker grievance system?

What gap does Karnataka's new system address? How will the welfare fee be used?

Shilpa Elizabeth

The story so far:

On May 1, 2026 – International Workers' Day – the Karnataka government announced the operationalisation of a specialised grievance redressal mechanism for platform-based gig workers in the State. Claimed to be the first government-backed grievance handling mechanism for gig workers in India, it allows workers to officially lodge complaints through the Integrated Public Grievance Redressal System (IPGRS), the State's centralised digital platform for addressing citizen grievances related to government schemes.

How does the system work?

Platform-based gig workers can now officially lodge grievances, including those related to pay, working conditions, and platform-specific disputes, via the IPGRS.

Under the Karnataka Platform-Based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Act, every aggregator platform must constitute an Internal Dispute Resolution Committee (IDRC). Grievances filed on

the IPGRS will be automatically routed to the respective platform's IDRC. Upon receiving a complaint, the IDRC is expected to attempt resolution within 15 working days, and is allowed up to 45 days to issue a final order. Any party aggrieved by the final decision can escalate the matter to the Karnataka Gig Workers Welfare Board within 30 days.

What concerns can a gig worker raise?

Gig workers can raise complaints related to suspension, blocking, or deactivation of accounts, termination from the platform, reduction or withholding of payments, unfair penalties, discrimination, unsafe working conditions, or other violations of rights guaranteed under the Act.

What gap does it address?

While many platforms have internal grievance redressal mechanisms, these systems exist outside a formal dispute resolution framework. As a result, gig workers have often reported a lack of resolution to their grievances. Many have complained that platforms quite often turn a blind eye to the workers' woes.

The Karnataka government's move seeks to bring more structure and transparency into the process and ensure legal recourse for these workers outside the formal economy. Gig workers can now officially lodge grievances through the portal, which will then be routed to the respective platform's IDRC. The government, as a central facilitator, will monitor the process.

Why is the mechanism being implemented now?

The Karnataka Platform-Based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Act, 2025, was officially notified in September 2025.

In March 2026, Karnataka became the first Indian State to notify the Rules to enact the law for gig workers. The grievance-redressal mechanism for gig workers in the State forms a crucial part of the Act. It is considered a major deterrent that would hinder arbitrary terminations or account deactivation of gig workers and address their concerns.

What are the other key developments related to the Act?

In January 2026, the Karnataka

Platform-Based Gig Workers Welfare Development Board was constituted to implement welfare measures.

Platforms have been mandated to furnish details of both the company and their gig workers – including name, age, phone number, Aadhaar number, UAN, and bank account details – to the Board. This data will be integrated into the Board's portal.

According to the government, so far, around 12 platforms/aggregators have provided details of 12 lakh active gig workers in the State.

However, given that several workers are associated with multiple platforms, the numbers could contain overlaps. This is expected to be sorted once the government comes up with unique IDs for each worker.

In February, the government announced that 1% of every transaction will be collected from aggregator platforms to provide social security benefits to platform-based gig workers.

What will the welfare fee be used for?

The welfare fee will go to the Karnataka Platform-Based Gig Workers' Fund to provide social security and welfare benefits to platform-based gig workers in the State.

According to government officials, schemes for gig workers, depending on the platform they work for, are being developed and will be put forward for deliberation at the next board meeting. The schemes being considered include life insurance, accidental benefit, disability benefit, medical benefit, maternity benefit, and old-age protection, depending on the nature of gig work.

THE GIST

Karnataka has operationalised a government-backed grievance redressal mechanism for platform-based gig workers, allowing them to lodge complaints through the IPGRS, which is routed to platform IDRCs for resolution.

The move aims to bring structure, transparency, and legal recourse to gig workers, addressing issues such as pay, working conditions, and arbitrary account deactivation.



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CJI's role in CEC, EC appointments was temporary, pending new law: SC

Court's observation was in response to pleas challenging a 2023 Act, which replaced the CJI with a Union Minister on the selection panel; petitioners argue this law overrides a Constitution Bench judgment which sought a panel of PM, LoP, CJI


Krishnadas Rajagopal
NEW DELHI

The Supreme Court on Wednesday said the Chief Justice of India's involvement in the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs) was only meant to last until Parliament came up with a law.

The court's observation was in response to multiple petitions challenging the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service, and Term of Office) Act of 2023.

The petitioners, who include the Association for Democratic Reforms and activist Jaya Thakur, said the 2023 law clothed the political executive of the day with a dominant, if not "exclusive", control over the appointment of the CEC and ECs.

The law was introduced in December 2023, ostensibly to countermand a Constitution Bench judgment in March the same year.



This judgment had declared that CEC and EC appointments should be made on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition of the Lok Sabha (LoP) or the leader of the largest Opposition party in the Lok Sabha, and the Chief Justice of India (CJI).

The court had ordered that its judgment would remain operative till "Parliament makes a law in consonance with Article 324(2) of the Constitution".

Consequently, the government brought the 2023 Act, replacing the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister in the committee. The current CEC, Gyanesh

Kumar, was the first to be appointed to the office under the new law.

'Prime Minister's man'
On Wednesday, senior advocate Vijay Hansaria, appearing for the petitioners, said the Constitution framers and the Supreme Court itself had never intended the CEC to be the "Prime Minister's baby or the Prime Minister's man".

Mr. Hansaria submitted that both the Constitution framers and the Supreme Court had warned against leaving the appointment of Election Commissioners exclusively in the hands of the executive.

He referred to the Supreme Court's own obser-

vations in the March 2023 Constitution Bench judgment (*Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India*) that the "fierce independence, neutrality and honesty" envisaged in the institution of the Election Commission required an end to government monopoly and "exclusive control" over appointments to the highest poll body.

Prior to the judgment, the CEC and ECs were appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The judgment had brought the appointment process on par with that of the CBI Director.

However, Justice Datta highlighted that even the Supreme Court had only intended the judgment to be operative till Parliament passed a law.

"Are you saying Parliament did not have the power to make the law? Or can a mandamus be given to Parliament to make a law only in a certain way?" Justice Datta asked.

Senior advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan, also for the petitioners, said

their case was not just about the replacement of the CJI with a Cabinet Minister in the committee. It was also about the constitutionality of an Act which had effectively reverted the control over the appointment of CEC and ECs to the Executive.

"The point is Election Commission appointments cannot be under the control of the executive," he submitted.

Mr. Sankaranarayanan said the Anoop Baranwal judgment had addressed a "legislative vacuum". Before March 2023, appointments of the CEC and ECs were made by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The "arrangement" had ensured that the power of appointment rested with the Political Executive.

"This mechanism ought to have stopped in the 1950s, but whichever parties came to power found the arrangement convenient," Mr. Sankaranarayanan said.

Arguments would continue on Thursday.



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GS Paper III – Environment

India to host first Big Cat Summit in June; 95 countries set to participate

Jacob Koshy
NEW DELHI

The inaugural International Big Cat Alliance (IBCA) Summit, to be held here from June 1 to 3, is expected to adopt the first-ever global declaration on big cat conservation. Titled the 'Delhi Declaration', it will articulate shared priorities, strengthen trans-boundary cooperation, and promote a landscape-based approach for conserving big cats and their habitats.

Representatives from 95 countries are expected to participate, the Ministry of Environment and Forests and Climate Change said on Wednesday.

The IBCA is an association of countries that host, or have itinerant populations of at least one of the seven 'big cats' – lions, tigers, leopards, snow leopards, cheetahs, jaguars,



Call for action: The summit will be guided by the theme 'Save big cats, save humanity, save ecosystem'. K.R. DEEPAK

and pumas – and are committed to the conservation of these animals.

Collective action

There are 24 member countries, three observer countries, and several other 'range' countries in the alliance. Member countries are expected to coordinate action through programmes and activities aimed at improving the

state of habitats, prey, and big cats, including big cat protection and conservation, innovation, research, development, and capacity building. They also share relevant information about big cat protection and conservation programmes.

Summit participants are likely to include heads of State/Government of member and observer coun-

tries, Environment Minister Bhupender Yadav said on Wednesday at an event to launch the summit website and unveil its logo. The summit will be guided by the theme 'Save big cats, save humanity, save ecosystem', and will bring together over 400 conservationists, policymakers, scientists, multilateral agencies, financial institutions, corporate leaders, and community representatives from across the globe.

Launched in 2023

The IBCA, piloted and conceived by India, was officially launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2023. The alliance, Mr. Yadav said, reflects India's belief that conservation challenges must be addressed "collectively" through cooperation, knowledge sharing, and mutual support.



GS Paper III – Biodiversity

Invasive species may be the wrong enemy in a changing subcontinent

India supports roughly 500 million cattle and other livestock, one of the largest such populations in the world, placing heavy grazing pressure on forests and the commons. In such conditions, 'palatable' species are suppressed while thorny, chemically defended, disturbance-tolerant plants persist

Suprabha Seethan

Across India, campaigns against invasive alien species (IAS) are gathering administrative and judicial force. Authorities now identify, map, classify, and remove species deemed ecological threats.

In the last year alone, India's English-language press has carried sustained coverage of ecological-loss studies, State eradication drives, and human-wildlife conflicts linked to such species. What was once a niche scientific concern has become a visible public issue and priority.

A recent Tamil Nadu court order even portrayed *Prosopis juliflora* shrubs as a near-Statewide threat. Government submissions have reported its clearance from 507 villages across 32 districts while the academic literature has recorded the species across the State. The plants *Lantana camara* and *Sesuvium portulacastrum* face similar campaigns elsewhere in India.

The prevailing assumption is simple: remove the invasive species and ecological recovery will follow.

Before accepting that, however, one must first ask: what condition was the landscape in before these species spread, and what conditions now sustain them?

These patterns emerge from the evidence.

Physical changes usually came first
Throughout India, native ecological communities had already been transformed before invasive plants became dominant.

Colonial forestry, plantation expansion, and settlement removed vast tracts of forest cover. Millions of hectares were converted to tea, coffee, rubber, oak, and eucalyptus plantations. Diverse habitats gave way to simplified commercial landscapes, with losing effects on soil biology, shade regimes, and water cycles. Logging, roads, mining, fire suppression, and chemical agriculture fragmented habitats further.

In places like Wayanad, forest edges had already degraded before species like *L. camara* spread into them. Biodiversity and its supporting conditions had already been decimated.

Removing a species alone can't restore what came before. Without functioning ecological relationships, more clearing creates new vacancies, often the very conditions in which another invasive species, or the same one, can quickly return.

P. juliflora was introduced to India in 1877 as part of a misguided ecological experiment. At first seeded from the air, it spread through the gaps of cattle that browsed its pods. Then came the 'Green Revolution' and the wider post-independent agricultural intensification. Canals expanded. Sorghums multiplied. Fertilizer use surged.

As a result, waterlogging and seepage increased in some regions, depleted aquifers in others, and productivity began to decline on abandoned lands. *P. juliflora* is a deep-rooted phytosymbiote that can exploit such altered water and soil regimes. In parts of Tamil Nadu, researchers have linked its surge to irrigation-related moisture conditions.

In other words, the plant was present for decades – what changed was the landscape around it.

Climate change, nutrient loading, land-use change, freshwater disruption,



India uses 25-40 million tonnes of urea per year and atmospheric nitrogen deposition now adds 30-30 kg per hectare annually across many regions. Woody nitrogen-fixing species such as *Sesuvium portulacastrum* (shown) benefit from such altered conditions. www.ips.gov.in

biodiversity loss, and chemical pollution are reshaping ecosystems worldwide. These are largely the effects of a globalised industrial culture pushing rapid urbanisation and infrastructure expansion.

Over three decades, India's urban governance footprint has roughly doubled, marking a systemic expansion of fragmented, high-disturbance landscapes that extend far beyond city boundaries into peri-urban and rural ecologies.

India also supports roughly 500 million cattle and other livestock – one of the largest such populations in the world – placing commons and heavy grazing pressure on forests and the commons. In such conditions, 'palatable' species are repeatedly suppressed while thorny, chemically defended, disturbance-tolerant plants such as *L. camara* persist or even expand.

Studies have revealed increasing woody cover across many open landscapes worldwide, partly associated with rising atmospheric carbon and other interacting factors. Fertiliser inputs remain high – India alone uses 15-40 million tonnes of urea per year – and atmospheric nitrogen deposition now adds 30-30 kg per hectare annually across many regions. Woody nitrogen-fixing species such as *S. portulacastrum* and *P. juliflora* benefit from such altered conditions.

A deeper invasion

Chemical pesticides have further altered soils and microbial networks. Over time, they can disrupt genes, reduce resilience, intensify pest cycles, and weaken the ecological foundations on which productivity itself depends.

These changes were driven less by individual choice than by policies, infrastructure, and economic systems designed to maximise production at scale. The result: food production must continue yet the same hydrological, chemical, and atmospheric systems that

increase output are also exhuming the land and degrading ecosystems now slated for restoration.

When multiple factors shift together, plant communities reorganise. *P. juliflora* growth is part of wider hydrological and chemical change across the subcontinent. Similar dynamics may apply, in differing ways, to other IAS. These plants may function as ecological first responders – species whose physiology suits rapid changes in landscape conditions.

Given time, other species follow these pioneer species. In the early stages, many may be exotic and fast-moving. Eventually, native species may also re-establish themselves. However, such ecological succession does not guarantee a return to earlier ecological states. As the underlying conditions continue to shift, new ecological assemblages are likely to emerge among the species able to thrive within them.

Life is conditional

Evolutionary and paleoecological evidence suggests that the world's native biomes developed under very different climatic and nutrient regimes. Grasslands expanded during drier phases of history while rainforests arose and diversified in warmer, wetter conditions. Many species can't easily tolerate the nutrient-rich soils, altered climate or hydrologically changed landscapes of the present.

Some IAS species may also perform compensatory ecological roles. They can accumulate heavy metals, nitrogen, and carbon in biomass, provide cover for smaller wildlife in disturbed landscapes, create conditions into which other species later enter, provide windbreaks, and bind soil. There are, of course, real consequences. Dense thickets of invasive plants can reduce accessible forage for elephants and other herbivores in forests and other habitats. But these effects unfold in landscapes already altered by logging, plantations, and nutrient enrichment.

Conservation efforts that target only the visible plant thus risk misdiagnosing the problem. It is easier to count acres of IAS removed than to measure shifts in moisture regimes or soil chemistry. Removal alone does not address the underlying drivers. Restoration requires that we read the land comprehensively, understand its history and interacting processes, and work with the ecological and human communities that remain.

What it will take

This does not mean certain species should never be removed but that restoration is difficult and requires attention to ecological processes and biodiversity. It is local, patient, and continuous. Large-scale mechanical removal brings complications of its own. While clearing vast acreages may serve a burgeoning biomass economy, there is little proof that it supports ecological recovery, which needs time.

Years that invasive species will take over often accompany business opportunities for earthmovers and new employment schemes. A villain, it seems, can animate an economy faster than restoration can.

Communities and practitioners embedded in these habitats are often best placed to undertake careful removal where it makes ecological and cultural sense. Success, however, remains uncertain and can only be judged over years. Restoration should proceed with least harm, phased planting, intergenerational care, and meaningful human livelihoods.

Otherwise, India risks spending much of its conservation energy removing plants that are symptoms of a wider civilisational transformation that it has yet to confront.

Suprabha Seethan lives and works at the Gurukul Biological Sanctuary in Wayanad district, Kerala. suprabha.seethan@gmail.com